6.01

Lecture 11: Probabilistic Modeling

Probability Theory

Probability theory provides a framework for:


- Modeling and reasoning about uncertainty
 - Making precise statements about uncertain situations
 - Drawing reliable inferences from unreliable observations
- Designing systems that are robust to uncertainty

Review: Axioms of Probability

A probability Pr(A) is assigned to each atomic event A.

The probabilities assigned to events must obey three axioms:

- $\Pr(A) \ge 0$ for all events A
- $\Pr(U) = 1$
- $\Pr(A \cup B) = \Pr(A) + \Pr(B) \Pr(A \cap B)$



Often times, the probability of an event happening changes depending on whether or not another event happened. The events are, generally, *dependent*.

Conditional probability:


 $\Pr(A \mid B)$


This probability (pronounced "the probability of A given B") represents the probability of event A happening, given that event B happened.

Here we know that B happened, so we can throw everything else away ("condition" on B).

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Conditioning on B restricts the sample space (which was U) to B:







U has shrunk to B

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


U has shrunk to B

$$\Pr(A \mid B) = \frac{\Pr(A \cap B)}{\Pr(B)}$$

Review: Symmetry

Decision trees are sequential, but set representation is symmetric.



We could compute the joint probability two ways: $Pr(B_1, B_2) = Pr(B_1) Pr(B_2 | B_1) = Pr(B_2) Pr(B_1 | B_2)$

Review: Inverse Probability

We can compute the joint probability Pr(A, B) in two ways:

 $\Pr(B_1, B_2) = \Pr(B_1) \Pr(B_2 | B_1) = \Pr(B_2) \Pr(B_1 | B_2)$

A slight manipulation gives us *Bayes' Theorem*:

$$\Pr(B_1 \mid B_2) = \frac{\Pr(B_1) \Pr(B_2 \mid B_1)}{\Pr(B_2)}$$

Allows for *anti-sequential* reasoning: infer causes from effects, or infer future events from past information.

"Inverse Probability:" infer causes from effects, or infer future events from past information

Basic idea: combine old *belief* with *evidence* to generate a new *belief*.

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Solving a Problem

From Last Week's Exercises:

$$\Pr(L=1) = 0.5$$

$$Pr(T = 1 \mid L = 1) = 0.8$$
$$Pr(T = 1 \mid L = 0) = 0.4$$

$$Pr(G = 1 | T = 1) = 0.1$$
$$Pr(G = 1 | T = 0) = 0.2$$

Check Yourself!

There are two people: Pat and Cameron.

What is the probability that Pat is older than Cameron?

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Subjective Probability: probabilities represent not frequencies of occurrance, but our *belief* about the likelihood of occurrance, and our uncertainty about the results.

Same math! Different *interpretation*!

Dice Game 1

Game:

- Four dice (each red or white) in a cup.
- You pull one die out of the cup.
- You get \$10 if the die is red, \$0 otherwise.

How much would you pay to play this game?

Expectation

The *expected value* of a random variable is the weighted sum of all possible values, with each value weighted by its probability:

$$E[X] = \sum_{x} x \cdot \Pr(X = x)$$

Example: let X represent the result of tossing one fair six-sided die.

$$E[X] = \left(1 \cdot \frac{1}{6} + 2 \cdot \frac{1}{6} + 3 \cdot \frac{1}{6} + 4 \cdot \frac{1}{6} + 5 \cdot \frac{1}{6} + 6 \cdot \frac{1}{6}\right) = \frac{21}{6} = 3.5$$

Which dice could be in the cup?

- 4 white
- 3 white, 1 red
- 2 white, 2 red
- 1 white, 3 red
- 4 red

How likely are these?

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Assume equally likely (for lack of a better assumption).

s = number of red	0	1	2	3	4
$\Pr(S=s)$	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2

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$$E[\$] = \$5.00$$

Assume that, before the bet, Adam pulls a random die, tells you its color, and returns it.

To update the belief based on this information, which of the following must be applied?

- 1. Bayes' Rule
- 2. Total Probability
- 3. Something Else

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$\Pr(O = red \mid S = s)$	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.0	
$\Pr(O = red, S = s)$	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	"Posterior"
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E[\$] = \$7.50

After telling you about the red die, Adam pulls another random die, tells you it is **white**, and returns it.

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							-
$ \Pr(O = \text{white } S = s)$	1.0	0.75	6 0.50	0.25	5 0.0	C	
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Belief								

$$E[\$] = \$5.00$$

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Using observations to improve on initial guess.

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Then we "observed" a white die:

s = number of red	0	1	2	3	4
$\Pr(S=s)$	0	0.3	0.4	0.3	0

Assume that now, Adam doesn't tell you the color of the die. Instead, one of the following people does:

- Pat is sneaky and wants to cheat you. Pat always says the opposite color from what was actually drawn.
- Cameron can't tell the difference between red and white, and so always chooses to tell you a color at random.

We are aware of these predispositions!

Pat always says the opposite color from what was actually drawn.

How does our belief state change when Pat tells us that a white brick was drawn?

- 1. Same as if Adam (honest) told us red was drawn.
- 2. Same as if Adam (honest) told us white was drawn.
- 3. It does not change.
- 4. It becomes more uniform.
- 5. It becomes less uniform.
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Modeling with Probability

Probability theory can be used to create models to characterize our uncertainty about events.

Say we want to build a model of the 6.01 course notes, to be able to automatically generate a text consisting of the exact same words a 6.01 faculty member would write.

Would need to build perfect model of MIT faculty's brain, accounting for initial conditions.

Can we build a useful probabilistic model, characterizing our uncertainty about the words in the text?

Assume MIT faculty aren't that clever. Consider the text as a sequence of random variables: W_t . Each variable is one word W_t which can take any value within a dictionary.

In the absence of information, draw each word uniformly at random from a dictionary. However, we have some information!


Last week, we introduced the idea of a state space, and its use for planning trajectories from some starting state to a goal. Our assumptions in that work were that we knew the initial state, and that the actions could be executed without error. That is a useful idealization in many cases, but it is also very frequently false. Even navigation through a city can fail on both counts: sometimes we don't know where we are on a map, and sometimes, due to traffic or road work or bad driving, we fail to execute a turn we had intended to take. In such situations, we have some information about where we are: we can make observations of our local surroundings, which give us useful information; and we know what actions we have taken and the consequences those are likely to have on our location. So, the question is:


how can we take information from a sequence of actions and local observations and integrate it into some sort of estimate of where we are? What form should that estimate take?

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Markov Chains

System is in some state that changes probabilistically with time.

Characterized by two distributions:

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Initial Belief: Pr(S_0)
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Transition Model: Pr(S_{t+1} | S_t)
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Assume system is **Markov**: distribution over states at time t + 1 depends only on distribution over states at time t.

What if the system changes with time? What if it changes probabilistically?


New Game:

- Four white dice in a cup.
- Behind your back, the following is repeated 3 times:
 - A random die is removed, and
 - A random replacement die is added
- You pull one die out of the cup.
- You get \$10 if the die is red, \$0 otherwise.


How much would you pay to play this game?

Modeling a Dynamic Probabilistic System

Remove a random die and replace it with a random die.




More compactly:




Markov Model of Transitions

Updated state probabilities depend only on prior state probabilities.




This process is **Markov**: that state distribution at time t depends only on the state distribution at time t - 1.

You know the distribution over states at time 0.



To find the distribution over states at time 1, which of the following must be applied?

- 1. Bayes' Rule
- 2. Total Probability
- 3. Something Else




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
$$\Pr(S_{t+1} = s') = \sum \Pr(S_t = s) \Pr(S_{t+1} = s' \mid S_t = s)$$

Modeling a Dynamic Probabilistic System


3 times: remove random, replace with random




Start by analyzing a simpler system:



A Markov Chain generates a probabilistic sequence of states.









time 2

The system is in one particular state at each discrete time step n. Examples of probabilistic sequences of states:




The sequence of states generated by a Markov Chain can be characterized probabilistically:



 $p_0[n+1] = (1-p)(p_0[n]) + p(p_1[n])$


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$$p_0[n+1] = (1-2p)(p_0[n]) + p$$

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


Similarly,

$$p_1[n+1] = (1-2p)(p_1[n]) + p_1[n]$$

We can calculate $p_1[n]$ iteratively, starting with $p_1[0] = 0$:

$$p_1[n+1] = (1-2p)(p_1[n]) + p$$



The difference equation for $p_1[n]$ is:

$$p_1[n+1] = (1-2p)(p_1[n]) + p_1[n]$$

What is $\lim_{n \to \infty} p_1[n]$?

- **1**. p
- **2**. 2p
- **3**. 0.5
- **4**. 2
- 5. none of the above


The difference equation for $p_1[n]$ is:

$$p_1[n+1] = (1-2p)(p_1[n]) + p_1[n]$$

What is $\lim_{n \to \infty} p_1[n]$?

- **1**. p
- **2**. 2p
- **3**. 0.5
- **4**. 2
- 5. none of the above


Two useful representations for Markov Chains:




6.01 Intro to EECS I

Lecture 11 (slide 67)


Slightly more complicated:




Assuming process starts in state 0, what probabilities correspond to $[S_0, S_1, S_2]$?



Slightly more complicated:



Assuming process starts in state 0, what probabilities correspond to $[S_0, S_1, S_2]$?




Previous model resulted in word *pairs* that were unrealistic (e.g. "the it").

Probability of next word depends on current word: Markov!




Previous model resulted in word *pairs* that were unrealistic (e.g. "the it").

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Previous model resulted in word *pairs* that were unrealistic (e.g. "the it"). Probability of next word depends on current word: Markov!




We have many goals for this course. Our primary goal is for you to type in a Python expression that will compute the name of the machine instance, and a method, called a priority queue is a data structure allows us, at the top: we give the procedure objects these numbers so we can think of this model as an equivalent circuit consisting of a 10V voltage source and 2 resistor can easily be solved. In this chapter, we will find 'x' and 'v'. We will concentrate on discrete-time models, meaning models whose inputs and outputs. The signals and systems approach has very broad applicability; it can be done, but it is never a sensible thing to do, and may result in meaningless answers. Imagine that we want to define a new class, called DDist, which stores its entries in a dictionary that is not present in the dictionary def remove Elt (items, i) = true otherwise $s_0 = 0$ Given an input x, the serial composition of these functions: given an input, and returns True if the first is the most straightforward application of this function. Why ? Because it will go off on a gigantic chain of doubling the starting state is a goal state, in other cases, we may see some examples where this pointer is different, in a way that preserves their meaning. A similar system that you might be inclined to take an apparently simpler approach, compute the acceleration of the car, you have to qualify them, as in math. sqrt (sum (), 10). There are two ways the copier could be in a good state at time 0 (probability 0 . 05], meaning that 'Alvssa' has a bank balance of 8, 300, 343, 03, getting 1, 26. It is much harder to read and understand. It may run forever if there is a system of interest.

German Latin English Detect language +	+7+	English Latin Spanish	Translate	
george w bush ist kein idiot	×			
(*) == *		☆ 匣 む く		# Wrong?

sh is an idiot
Ø Wrong?

Often, cannot directly observe the state of the underlying system. Examples:

- Data Transmission (what was original sequence?)
- Speech Recognition (what sentence was spoken?)
- Machine Translation (what is this sentence in French?)
- What is behind the box?



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State still changes probabilistically with time, but we cannot directly observe the state. Instead, we can observe some related quantity.

Characterized by *three* distributions:

```
Initial Belief: Pr(S_0)
```

```
Transition Model: Pr(S_{t+1} | S_t)
```

```
Observation Model: Pr(O_t | S_t)
```

Want to infer underlying state. Idea:

- update belief based on observation: $Pr(S'_t \mid O_t = o)$
- update based on transition: $\Pr(S_{t+1} \mid S'_t)$
- repeat!

In updating the belief based on an observation, which of the following should be applied?

- 1. Bayes' Rule
- 2. Total Probability
- 3. Something Else

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$$\Pr(S'_t = s \mid O_t = o) = \frac{\Pr(O_t = o \mid S_t = s) \Pr(S_t = s)}{\Pr(O_t = o)}$$

Example

Prior Belief:

$$\Pr(S_0 = H) = 0.8$$
 $\Pr(S_0 = M) = 0.2$

Observation Model:

$$Pr(O_t = C \mid S_t = H) = 0.1$$
$$Pr(O_t = C \mid S_t = M) = 0.6$$


$$Pr(O_t = S \mid S_t = H) = 0.9$$
$$Pr(O_t = S \mid S_t = M) = 0.4$$

Transition Model:

$$Pr(S_{t+1} = H \mid S_t = H) = 0.5 \qquad Pr(S_{t+1} = M \mid S_t = H) = 0.5$$
$$Pr(S_{t+1} = H \mid S_t = M) = 0.2 \qquad Pr(S_{t+1} = M \mid S_t = M) = 0.8$$

Labs This Week

Bayesian estimation of robot location.



Model the location of the robot as a Markov process Estimate the location of the robot from sonar observations